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It has been three years since we published A Guide to the ATM and Debit Card Industry.
Those three years represent a very dynamic time in the industry with a number of impor-
tant developments. Some trends and patterns have persisted or accelerated, while others
have peaked or reversed. Still others have emerged for the first time. The purpose of this
2006 Update is to document these trends and patterns by updating the data we presented
in the original book and to discuss their implications for the current and future state of
the industry. 
The most important development is that the two segments of the industry, ATM and
debit, are in some sense going in opposite directions. The ATM industry has matured
and is relatively stagnant, with major players jockeying for position, searching for and
adopting different business strategies, and adjusting to the maturation of the industry.
The debit card industry, in contrast, is expanding rapidly, with new players, new part-
nerships, new products, and new markets. The challenge in the debit card industry is not
how to cope with a maturing industry but, rather, how to preserve and enhance position
and not be left behind. 
In the first part of this Update, we highlight and discuss some of the most important
changes in the ATM and debit card industry. For both the ATM and debit sides of the
industry, we recap and analyze changes in activity levels, industry structure, and industry
pricing. We then offer some thoughts on what might lie ahead, including a discussion of
fraud and data security. In the second part of this Update, we present updated versions of
the 23 charts and 11 tables from the original book, adding the three or four years of addi-
tional data that have since become available. 
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Developments in the ATM market
Industry recap
The ATM industry appears to have reached a saturation point. The total number of
ATM transactions peaked around 2000 and generally has been declining since (Figure
1).
1 The average number of transactions per ATM peaked several years earlier (1992).
In 2006, for the first time since at least 1983, the total number of ATM terminals
declined from the previous year.
2 On-premise ATM deployment has held steady for
six years. In contrast, in 2006 off-premise deployment fell. The pullback of ATM
deployment, however, has not been sufficient to stop the trend toward lower transac-
tions per ATM.
The number of ATM networks continues to decline, from 127 in 1984 to 40 in 2002
to 25 in 2006.
3 One would expect this decline to have led to a further concentration
of ATM transaction and switch volume, and there is an upward trend to concentration
up to 2002, but not after. Recent stabilization of industry concentration is consistent
with a lack of mergers or acquisitions among the top networks in the last few years,
although this conclusion is tentative because of a change in how network transactions
are measured.
4, 5
The top regional network continues to be Star.
6However, from 2003 to 2006 Star’s ATM
market share declined from 31.0 percent to 23.7 percent, while the share for Visa’s Plus
network increased from 12.0 percent to 20.8 percent.
7 Plus is the second-largest ATM
network, with NYCE, Co-op, and Pulse rounding out the top five. Despite changes in
market shares of the top two networks, the overall standing of networks relative to one

















Annual transactions per ATM (right scale)
Total annual transactions (left scale)
Notes: Total annual transactions include bank on-us and in-network transactions.Data prior to 2002 include some gateway transactions,and
therefore they are likely overstated compared to 2002 and after.
Source: EFT Network Data Book (various years).
another (under current methodology) has been fairly stable: The ranking of the top six
networks in 2006 is the same as that in 2002.
8
At 99.9 percent and 97.2 percent, respectively, Plus and MasterCard’s Cirrus network
have retained their exceptionally high coverage ratio (the number of ATMs in the speci-
fied network as a percentage of all installed ATMs).
9 Star has increased its coverage
steadily in recent years, to just below 74 percent, and remains in third place. Pulse and
NYCE have increased their coverage dramatically in the last several years. From 2002 to
2006, the coverage ratio for Pulse increased from 26 percent to 63 percent and that for
NYCE increased from 22 percent to 70 percent. Pulse’s increase can be attributed to gains
in network membership and NYCE’s to agreements with ATM independent sales organ-
izations (ISOs).
10
One of the most interesting long-run trends in the ownership structure among large
regional networks is the emergence of nonbank and single-bank forms of ownership
at the expense of bank joint ventures.
11, 12 Another development is the acquisition of
networks by large payment processing organizations. Fiserv (a nonbank), Elan (a
subsidiary of U.S. Bank), and Metavante (a subsidiary of Marshall and Isley) have
each recently acquired networks.
13
Available data show growing concentration among ATM drivers and ISOs over the last
several years. For example, the top five firms now drive over 50 percent of terminals
(Figure 2). Concentration among ISOs, as measured by the share of ATM management
contracts, is more diffuse than ATM driving, but it also shows a rising trend (Figure 3).
These data are consistent with recent developments in the ATM manufacturing, servicing,
and operating industry. In 2004, there were three larger ISO acquisitions: Cardtronics
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purchased 12,000 ATMs from E*Trade, 7-Eleven bought 5,483 ATMs from American
Express, and TRM acquired 17,000 ATMs from eFunds.
14 In early 2005, NCR purchased
ATM maker Tidel Engineering, and in the ATM driving market, Elan purchased Genpass,
making Elan the third-largest driver.
15 More recently, in the ATM servicing arena, Efmark
and Bantek West are merging, and Cardtronics purchased Allpoint.
16
In our 2003 book we noted that ownership of ATM terminals was becoming less concen-
trated, while the general ATM industry was becoming more concentrated. Now,
ownership concentration of ATM terminals has stopped declining and may be rising a
bit.
17 The decline over the period from 1998 to 2002 largely reflected the rapid expan-
sion of off-premise ATM terminals by ISOs. As noted above, that expansion has slowed
considerably. The slight increase in concentration since has resulted from at least two
factors. First, there has been some consolidation among ATM ISOs. Second, the largest
financial institutions continue to expand their ATM fleets, perhaps in conjunction with
building branches. Consolidation in banking also has had some effect, particularly the
2004 merger between Bank One and JPMorgan Chase. 
Turning now to developments in pricing in the industry, there have been few changes in
wholesale pricing and continued increases in some retail ATM fees. Perhaps more inter-
esting are changes in the structure of pricing. 
Per-transaction wholesale ATM fees (switch fees and interchange fees) have shown little
change since 2002, suggesting the industry has reached a wholesale pricing equilib-
rium.
18, 19 However, most major networks now have tiered switch fee structures, which
are typically based on transaction volume. Thus, while published fees have been stable,
there likely has been some change in revenue per transaction after accounting for tiered
pricing. Interchange fees also vary, although the variation is not based on volume.
Interchange fees are sometimes determined by whether a transaction is at an on- or off-
premise ATM. Nonbank off-premise ATM owners, for example, face lower interchange
fees on the Plus network and receive higher interchange fees on the Co-op, NYCE, Star,
and possibly other networks, compared with other ATM owners. Interchange fees also
can be tied to geographic zones of a network, such as Pulse setting a higher interchange
fee for former TYME participants than for other participants.
20
The Federal Reserve Board’s annual survey of bank fees was discontinued after 2002,
preventing an update of our original table on retail ATM fees.
21 Instead, Figure 4 lists
recent estimates of ATM foreign fees and surcharges from available industry sources. It
suggests that, on average, foreign fees are higher in 2006 than in 2001, but the rates may
have stabilized recently. Differences in samples and methods make it difficult to gener-
alize about the trend in surcharges, but it seems fair to say that average surcharges are as
high in 2006 as they have ever been.
22
Discussion
As the ATM industry enters a mature phase, two related issues are key to recent devel-
opments and the industry’s future. First, surcharging has had a major impact on recent
developments and, thus, is influencing the industry’s structure. Second, the decline in
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transactions per ATM and the recent slowdown in total ATM transactions are influ-
encing the various strategies that industry participants are pursuing.
The early effects of surcharging fit nicely with what an economic model of the ATM
market would predict. Soon after Visa and MasterCard allowed surcharging in 1996,
there was a strong supply response that increased the number of ATM terminals, espe-
cially in off-premise locations.
23 While there were protests against surcharging at the
time, the fact that many ATMs were installed and used suggests there was an unsat-
isfied demand for ATM services. ATM transactions grew even though the price of the
service rose, likely because convenience increased as the geographic dispersion of
ATMs rose.
24, 25
The expanded reach of ATMs from 1996 to 2000 brought increased revenue to ATM
owners. But, as the ATM market became more saturated, the demand side of the market
began to assert itself as surcharges became more of an issue to consumers. This was
reflected in a change in their use of ATM services. Consumer surveys document that
ATM customers shifted their usage toward ATMs owned by their financial institution,
increased their use of debit and credit cards instead of cash, and obtained cash back
during PIN debit transactions.
26 One result of the consumer response to surcharging was
that financial institutions experienced a decline in the percentage of foreign transactions
at both on- and off-premise ATMs and an associated decline in surcharge and inter-
change fee revenue.
27
This changing consumer behavior triggered a second supply-side response. New ATM
deployment has slowed considerably in the period after 2002 as many ATM owners have
trimmed their ATM portfolios.
28 Perhaps the surest sign of a saturated market is evidence
that revenue per ATM has fallen.
29
In combination, these demand and supply responses to surcharging, while initially
boosting profitability of ATMs, have in the long run likely harmed profitability among
Figure 4: Estimates of ATM Foreign Fees and Surcharges,2001-2006
Fee  ATM Location Data Source 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Foreign fee All Federal Reserve
1 $1.17 $1.14  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Bankrate.com
2 $1.20 $1.22 $1.31 $1.28  $1.37  $1.29 
Surcharge All Federal Reserve
1 $1.32 $1.36  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Bankrate.com
2 $1.36 $1.40 $1.38 $1.32  $1.40  $1.60 
On-premise Dove Consulting
3 $1.45 n.a. $1.57 n.a. n.a. $1.74 
Off-premise Dove Consulting
3 $1.48 n.a. $1.65 n.a. n.a. $1.79 
Notes: Data sources are (1) Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,2002; (2) McBride,2005,2006; and (3) Hayes and others,2002,
2004,and D’Ambrosio and others,2006.
Bankrate.com’s data prior to 2005 are from the chart shown in McBride,2006.
The sample size varies by survey: The Federal Reserve’s samples included about 620 banks and savings associations; Bankrate.com surveyed
the largest banks and thrifts in each of the 25 largest markets nationally; Dove’s samples are 127 (Hayes and others,2002),134 (Hayes and
others,2004),and 161 deployers (D’Ambrosio and others,2006),which include banks,credit unions,and ATM ISOs.
n.a.= not available.8 A Guide to the ATM and Debit Card Industry: 2006 Update
owners, especially ISOs. They also have put stress on other industry participants such as
networks, ATM drivers, and ATM manufacturers.
The industry has begun to recognize the negative impact that high surcharges can have
on transaction volume, and as a result, the strategies of various industry participants are
in a state of flux. We complete this discussion by outlining some of the ways industry
participants are reorienting their approach to the ATM business. 
One approach some ATM ISOs, such as eFunds, E*Trade, and American Express, have
taken is simply to exit the market. A second approach is to find ways to increase traffic
at ATMs. One method is to form surcharge-free alliances such as that created by the
Allpoint network. Cardtronics, whose ATMs had been the largest portion of the Allpoint
network, has affirmed the strategy by purchasing Allpoint.
30 ISOs also can take this route
directly by waiving surcharges, as the Sheetz convenience store chain has done, hoping
that increased transaction volume and cross-sales of store merchandise will more than
make up the loss of surcharge revenue.
31 An alternative method is to partner with a finan-
cial institution and brand the ATM with the name of the financial institution, as
7-Eleven has done with Citigroup.
32The agreement enables Citigroup to expand market
presence and services to customers, while 7-Eleven gains a large customer base with more
incentive to visit its ATMs. 
Theoretically, the best strategy for the largest financial institutions with extensive fleets of
ATMs may be to establish a high surcharge, and evidence suggests a positive relation
between surcharges and size of financial institutions.
33 Large financial institutions may
give up some foreign transactions as a result but are willing to do so because surcharging
provides incentives for consumers to become customers of the bank and take advantage
of the bank’s many ATMs.
34
For mid-tier and smaller banks, we observe a variety of strategic approaches. RBC
Centura Bank, for example, does not surcharge while Washington Mutual has recently
imposed surcharges.
35 Most banks surcharge noncustomers, but, evidence suggests that
some have moved toward selective surcharges.
36 While there are many different forms of
surcharge-free alliances, their fundamental aim is to increase traffic at ATMs while at the
same time increasing services to customers, which helps counter the advantages of large
financial institutions.
37 A similar arrangement is agent-bank and partnership relationships
among financial institutions that allow customers to use each other’s ATMs without
surcharging.
38 Finally, financial institutions frequently search for new services to add to
ATMs, and the latest trend is to add imaging capability. This has been appealing to banks
of all sizes with the hope of attracting customers to use ATMs to deposit checks or cash.
39
Sluggish overall transaction volume and the decline in foreign transaction volume
reflecting consumer reaction to surcharging and bank mergers all have hurt ATM
network switch fee revenue. Networks have followed several strategies to recover lost
revenues. Co-op and MoneyPass formed surcharge-free networks, where no members
can surcharge. Star, NYCE, Pulse, Cirrus, and Plus allow selective surcharge-free
alliances, where members can choose whether to join or not. MasterCard has an agree-
ment that allows its prepaid and debit card issuers to offer surcharge-free use of thousands
of Cardtronics ATMs.
40 Some networks have increased the number of ATMs in the
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network to boost ATM volume, such as NYCE’s agreements with ISOs and Pulse adding
to its membership. 
For networks, an alternative to expanding usage is to take market share from other
networks. Pulse has opened ATMs in its network to holders of Discover cards, which may
pull some transactions from other networks.
41 Plus has gained market share, largely at the
expense of Star, by inducing many financial institutions to select Plus as a preferred
network.
42 Finally, some regional networks—such as Co-op, NYCE, and Star—set higher
interchange fees paid to ATM ISOs, encouraging them to keep the network’s mark on
their ATMs and possibly enhancing the network’s overall transaction volume. 
Forming a backdrop to these short-term adjustments to declining transactions are longer-
term trends in network ownership. The falloff in bank joint venture ownership may be
explained by the industry’s life cycle and by disadvantages that bank joint ventures might
have. One, when an industry is in its infant stage, vertical integration is common as it
was in the ATM industry for banks. But, as the industry matures, new specialized firms,
such as nonbank processors and processors controlled by a bank, may appear.
43 Two, as
more members join a network, it may become more challenging to coordinate decision
making.
44 And, three, research has shown that industry instability can reduce the life of
joint ventures, suggesting consolidation within the banking industry may have
contributed to the demise of networks formed as joint ventures.
45 Nonbank and single-
bank forms of ownership may not face these challenges, potentially contributing to their
rising importance among the largest ATM networks. 
The acquisition of networks by payment processors may be tied to economies of scope
and improved security. Economies of scope allow combined processor/network enter-
prises to avoid transaction costs required when interacting with several suppliers.
46 It also
can allow bundling of services that result in a lower price compared with purchasing the
services from separate companies.
47 Finally, combined processor/network enterprises have
control over many interrelated segments of the payment supply chain and may be able
to more easily coordinate the implementation of security controls. 
Developments in the debit card market
Industry recap
By most measures—including the total number of debit transactions, the number of
debit cards issued, the average number of transactions per card, and the number of point
of sale (POS) terminals—the debit industry has experienced robust growth.
Both PIN (online) and signature (offline) debit are growing rapidly: The annual growth
rates of PIN and signature debit during the 2002-06 period were 25 percent and 19
percent, respectively (Figure 5).
48 Consumer studies confirm this growth. Surveys
conducted by Dove Consulting show that consumers have markedly increased their PIN
and signature debit use at the POS since 1999, partially displacing the use of cash and
checks.
49 The report also estimates that the debit share of consumer transactions at the
POS is now close to 33 percent, up from 21 percent in 1999.
 The number of merchant outlets that accept PIN debit also has grown steadily, as has the
number of merchant outlets that accept signature debit (Figure 6). Currently, signature
debit has a 3-to-1 lead in merchant outlets over PIN debit. However, most large
merchants accept PIN debit, which is one reason why the current lead in transaction
volume for signature over PIN debit is only 1.6-to-1.
Signature debit obtained its lead in merchant acceptance for two reasons. First, signature
debit had an early advantage because it is processed on the Visa and MasterCard credit
card networks. Credit card acceptance was well established prior to 1990, and both
networks had an “honor all cards” rule that required merchants that accepted Visa or
MasterCard credit cards to also accept their debit cards. As a result, by 1995, signature
debit acceptance was much higher than PIN debit acceptance. Second, Visa and
MasterCard both have made considerable investments in developing and promoting
signature debit. 
As shown by its steady increase in merchant acceptance, PIN debit networks also have
worked to develop their markets. But research has shown that growth in merchant
acceptance of PIN debit is uneven over retail sectors, with convenience and department
stores showing the fastest growth since 2000.
50 It is likely that the retail sectors with the
highest benefit-cost ratio for adopting PIN debit have been the leaders.
There has been noticeable movement in the market shares of PIN and signature debit in
recent years (Figure 7). From 1995 to 2002, signature debit gained significant market
share at the expense of PIN debit. But, since 2002, PIN debit’s market share has
increased. Whether this signals a comeback for PIN debit is an intriguing question that
we revisit in the discussion below.
The overall structure of the debit industry continues to evolve but is showing some
nascent signs of stabilizing. The number of PIN debit networks declined from 23 in
2002 to 14 in 2006.
51 While hardly a sure sign of stability, the number of networks, after
declining each year from 1996 to 2004, was the same in 2004 and 2006. Concentration
also has been unchanged since 2002 despite the fact that the number of networks
declined.
52  This may be a more reliable indicator of stability and reflects the facts that no
major networks exited the market and no major mergers occurred. However, as a result
of changes in the methodology for how networks report transactions, more time and data
are needed to confirm industry stability.
53
There have been some major changes in PIN debit market share among the top
networks, with Visa’s Interlink gaining largely at the expense of Star. Loss of Star’s market
share has been particularly dramatic—its share in 2002 was 57.3 percent, but it has fallen
by almost half since then.
54 In contrast, Interlink’s share has grown from 14.4 percent in
2002 to 39.5 percent in 2006. After being in second place for many years, in 2005
Interlink became the largest PIN debit network. 
Despite Interlink’s gain in market share, overall concentration in the PIN network
industry has been stable in recent years.
55 Similarly, the market for debit card issuing has
shown stability, with concentration among top issuers unchanged since 2002.
56
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There also have been some developments in wholesale pricing of debit transactions.
Similar to ATM pricing, switch fees for debit transactions recently have been steady,
although Star has raised the switch fee paid by issuers.
57 In contrast with ATM pricing,
however, interchange fees for PIN debit have increased recently.
58 Interlink has been the
market leader, dramatically raising its interchange fee in 2002. Most of the PIN debit
networks since have raised their interchange fees, although more gradually in most
instances. After setting an interchange rate that was below market for many years,
MasterCard’s Maestro raised its rate dramatically in 2003, to now be among the highest.
Pulse also lagged the market for some time but more than doubled its non-supermarket
interchange fee in 2005 to make its fee among the highest in the industry. 
The gap between signature and PIN debit interchange fees has narrowed since 2001.
Figure 8 shows the interchange fees for the top four PIN debit networks and for the two
signature debit networks. As can be seen, partial convergence has been the result of a
slight decline in interchange fees for signature debit and a large increase for PIN debit.
Convergence is not complete, however, with signature debit interchange fees remaining
higher than PIN debit interchange fees. 
Since our last report, wholesale pricing has become more complex. Volume discounts for
switch fees are common. Both signature and PIN debit networks now provide
discounted interchange rates to large volume retailers.
59 In addition, special interchange
fees for retail segments have moved beyond supermarkets. MasterCard and Visa have
been particularly aggressive in pricing for quick-service restaurants. 
Figure 7: Market Share for PIN and Signature Debit

















Source: EFT Network Data Book (various years).An Essay 13
Because of structured pricing, the consequences of partial convergence of interchange
fees are different for various merchants and card issuers. The interchange fees shown
in Figure 8 are default rates most relevant to smaller merchants. These merchants have
thus benefited from the small decrease in signature debit fees but are paying more for
PIN debit. Larger merchants with sufficient transaction volume get discounts
according to a tiered interchange fee schedule, and the largest merchants negotiate
discounts. Without specific information on criteria that qualify for discounts or on
negotiated fees, we cannot say to what extent the convergence has affected these
merchants. For card issuers, volume discounts mean that the average revenue they
receive from PIN and signature interchange is less than the default rates would
suggest. But without information on the degree of discounting across signature and
PIN debit, we cannot say whether the convergence seen in Figure 8 is paralleled in
average issuer revenue across signature and PIN debit.
60
Additional information now is available on retail pricing of debit transactions. The
Federal Reserve Board conducted a study on PIN fees in 2004.
61 It found that 14 percent
of surveyed depository institutions charged a PIN fee. Among larger depository institu-
tions, 24 percent imposed a PIN fee. There also was considerable regional variation in
PIN fees, with Northeast institutions most likely to impose a PIN fee and those in the
West least likely. The fees range from $0.1 to $2, with an average fee of about $0.75. The
study also surveyed households, with 13 percent of respondents reporting that their
depository institutions charged PIN fees and a smaller portion reporting a charge for
signature debit as well.
62
Figure 8: Debit Card Interchange Fees
Note: In August 2003, MasterCard and Visa changed their rates, as set forth in the so-called Wal-Mart settlement. The restriction on inter-
change fees ended on January 1,2004.































$50 Transaction (Non−Supermarket) Default RateDebit card rewards appear to be gaining in popularity, although they primarily target
signature debit. Dove Consulting reports that 13 percent of respondents to a consumer
survey received rewards on either PIN, signature, or both in 2005, up from 8 percent in
2003.
63 Among those receiving debit rewards, 50 percent are for only signature debit, 11
percent are for only PIN debit, and 39 percent are for both. In a separate study of debit
card issuers, Dove reports that 36 percent of issuers (primarily large banks) offer rewards
programs, and an additional 23 percent are actively considering offering one.
64 Of the
issuers with rewards programs, 71 percent offer rewards on only signature debit, and 29
percent offer rewards for both PIN and signature debit.
Discussion
Two themes underlie developments in the debit card industry over the past three years.
The first is the exceptionally strong growth of the industry, growth that continued from
earlier years and is showing no sign of slowing in the near future. This growth is apparent
in virtually all measures: overall transaction volume, PIN debit transaction volume, signa-
ture debit transaction volume, average number of transactions per card, number of PIN
debit POS terminals (PIN pads), and number of cards. The second is the dramatic devel-
opments in the competitive environments in which regional and national PIN and
signature debit card networks find themselves. These developments, in turn, have been
influenced by important court rulings and lawsuits. 
Debit is the fastest-growing retail payments type in the United States, posting double-
digit annual growth of 21 percent from 2002 to 2006. According to Bank for
International Settlements figures, debit’s share of noncash transactions has increased
from 17 percent in 2002 to 23 percent in 2004.
65 Why is the industry experiencing
such growth?
On the demand side of the market, consumer perceptions about debit cards have become
increasingly positive. One study shows consumer comfort levels and perception of speed
for debit cards rose during the period from 1999 to 2005.
66 Increased comfort and
convenience have contributed to a substitution of debit for cash and checks at the POS.
This source of growth will continue into the future for several reasons. First, many POS
transactions are still conducted with cash and checks, leaving room for more substitution
by debit. Second, demographics favor debit because it tends to be favored by younger
consumers.
67 Third, consumers respond to the incentives of rewards programs for debit
cards, and these programs are increasingly available.
68
Consumers also can more easily find merchants who accept debit. More merchant loca-
tions have PIN pads, for example, in part because the costs of installing PIN pads have
declined.
69 They also find it easier to use debit for online transactions. More Internet
merchants accept signature debit (without a signature), and some online billers accept
PIN debit (without a PIN). 
14 A Guide to the ATM and Debit Card Industry: 2006 Update
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On the supply side of the market, banks largely prefer debit transactions over cash and
checks, and make a concerted effort to issue debit cards to their customers. Some large
banks now report 80 percent or more of their checking account customers as holding
debit cards.
70 Adoption of technology that allows instant issuance of debit cards reflects
this push.
71 Some analysts believe payroll cards may provide further growth to debit trans-
actions because they have become more viable with a recent revision to the Federal
Reserve’s Regulation E.
72
Because of the difference in interchange revenue between signature and PIN debit, some
banks have pushed signature debit by offering signature rewards or imposing PIN fees.
Discover’s decision to expand into signature debit was likely motivated in part by the
attractiveness of higher interchange fees to potential card issuers.
73 Other banks promote
both types of debit transactions, recognizing that PIN debit still saves costs compared
with checks.
74 With the interchange fee difference narrowing to some extent, banks may
have less reason to favor one form of debit over the other. They may get behind both
forms of debit and push for continuing the upward trend in transactions per debit card. 
Networks also are promoting debit. Visa, for example, offers the Visa Extras program to
issuers who wish to provide incentives to their signature debit card holders. One of the
most important ways networks support debit growth is by developing new markets. They
help develop new merchant categories, such as quick-service restaurants. Visa, for
example, targets cash-heavy businesses by waiving signature requirements for qualified
transactions under $25 and reducing interchange fees for consumer transactions under
$15.
75 Networks also are targeting e-commerce payments. MasterCard has teamed with
PayPal to develop a “virtual debit” application for online payments. Similarly, PIN debit
networks have begun to offer PIN-less debit, which for purposes of risk control are
limited to billers in certain industries such as utilities, telecommunications, education,
and insurance. Star’s PIN-less transaction volume was 8.9 million in 2003 and increased
by 190 percent in 2004 and by another 53 percent in the first quarter of 2006.
76
The second theme underlying recent developments in the debit industry is the tremen-
dous amount of network competition in the industry. Our original book discussed three
competitive battlegrounds within debit card networks: (1) competition among regional
PIN debit networks, (2) competition between regional and national PIN debit networks,
and (3) competition between PIN and signature debit networks. 
All three remain very much in play today, and the economics of the industry make it
likely that they will continue into the foreseeable future. The basic product of electronic
funds transfer networks is information, and the underlying economics of information
goods tends to push the market toward a “winner takes all” outcome.
77 The debit card
industry is a declining cost technology, so that each network has an incentive to become
as large as possible. In addition, similar to any network good, there is interdependence
among supply and demand in payments. Consumers are more likely to choose a partic-
 ular payment type if it is widely accepted, and merchants are more likely to accept a
particular payment type if it is used by many consumers. As a result, payment brands that
are first to market have an advantage, and there is intense competition to bring clients
into the network. 
As an example of this competition among regional networks, Pulse has gained market
share relative to Star and NYCE, in part by adding to its membership.
78 But recently,
JPMorgan Chase decided to reissue its debit cards in a manner that would shift transac-
tions away from the Pulse and toward Star and Interlink.
79 In fact, this type of
competition has been evident for some years and has made the term “regional network”
something of a misnomer. The big three EFT networks—Star, NYCE, and Pulse—used
to have well-defined regional territories but now have broad national coverage.
80
Arguably, a bigger story is the intense competition between the large regional
networks and the national PIN debit networks, especially Visa’s Interlink. Regionals
as a group—and Star in particular—have lost considerable market share to Interlink.
Interlink’s share is now 39.4 percent, a doubling in just three years. Star’s market
share, meanwhile, has declined from 50 percent to 29 percent. Several large issuers,
such as Bank of America, Wells Fargo, JPMorgan Chase, and Wachovia, have moved
from Star to Interlink. This shift is attributable in part to Interlink’s sharp hike in
interchange fees. But Visa also may be recognizing the value of size in its EFT oper-
ations. It has placed emphasis on going after the largest issuers by using interchange
fees as well as other tools, such as no-mark cards (just the Visa brand and no Interlink
mark) if banks do not join other networks.
81 According to a few reports, Visa also has
made large payments to members for switching to Interlink.
82 Knowing that they
need to maintain transaction volume, other networks have countered these tactics by
offering deals to bring in members, even to smaller banks.
83 
There has been a good deal of activity on the PIN-versus-signature-debit battleground as
well. Some is a result of the dynamics associated with consumer and merchant prefer-
ences as well as the continued efforts for both forms of debit to develop new markets. But
much also has to do with the fallout of the May 2003 settlement of the class action
lawsuit brought by Wal-Mart, Sears, and other retailers against Visa and MasterCard.
The settlement required the card associations to pay $3 billion in damages, reduce signa-
ture debit interchange fees by one-third for a period of five months, and conspicuously
mark cards so that merchants could identify debit cards. The settlement had the poten-
tial for helping PIN debit by giving merchants that accept Visa or MasterCard credit
cards the option of refusing their signature debit cards. 
Other than the $3 billion payment for damages, many merchants would argue that the
promised benefits of the settlement for merchants have proved elusive. PIN debit’s share
of total debit transactions has crept up a bit in last couple of years but signature still
accounts for 61 percent of transactions. PIN lags despite tending to be favored by
consumers and merchants. Surveys have shown that more consumers prefer PIN to
signature debit, at least since 2001.
84 Both consumers and merchants like the fact that for
most transactions PIN debit is more secure than signature (see “Data security and fraud,”
p. 20). Merchants and some online billers also prefer PIN debit because it is a less-costly
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 form of payment. Some merchants actively engage in efforts to steer customers toward
PIN debit: According to a recent survey of retailers, 33 percent of respondents attempted
to steer customers toward preferred payment methods.
85 In light of PIN debit’s advan-
tages, some wonder why steering is not used more often.
86
Signature debit has maintained its lead for a number of reasons, however. Issuers have an
incentive to promote signature debit because of its greater profitability. One pricing
strategy is to impose PIN fees on consumers to make signature debit relatively less expen-
sive. Another strategy is to offer more lucrative reward programs for signature debit.
87, 88
Both PIN and signature networks are developing new markets, such as online
payments. Visa has been successful in getting signature debit holders to use its cards
for online transactions. In the first quarter of 2005, it announced that for the first
time its signature debit cards were used more often for online purchases than its credit
cards.
89 PIN debit has seen some success with PIN-less debit for online payments, but
it has been limited to bill payment for a select group of billers.
90 Recent news reports
identify Fiserv and its Accel/Exchange network as continuing to expand the use of
PIN debit for online retail transactions.
91
One way networks compete, of course, is via pricing, especially via interchange fees.
Interchange fees have been the focus of much attention recently. In the United States,
merchants have identified interchange fees as one of the fastest-growing business
expenses.
92This reflects the general rise in interchange rates as well as the increased use of
credit and debit cards relative to cash and checks. As noted above, in the last few years,
signature debit interchange fees have been relatively stable while PIN debit interchange
fees have moved sharply higher. 
Although the 2003 settlement gave merchants the option to reject signature debit, most
merchants choose not to do so. First, many merchants accept signature but not PIN
debit, so rejecting signature debit would mean not accepting debit at all.
93 Second,
competitive pressures and customer service make it difficult for merchants to reject
payment cards.
94The experience of Walgreens drugstore chain illustrates the difficulty of
eliminating a payment alternative. It decided to stop accepting the American Express
credit card in December 2004 but a month later reversed its decision.
95 Third, signature
debit is still cheaper for merchants than a credit card payment. 
The 2003 settlement has not resolved the dispute between merchants and card issuers.
From the point of view of many merchants, the outcome has not been satisfactory—
signature interchange fees fell somewhat, but PIN interchange fees rose substantially and
the option to reject certain types of payments has not been seen as a viable alternative. 
Merchants have continued to seek relief through lobbying efforts and litigation. For
example, at a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on July 19, 2006, merchants and
networks presented their points of view.
96 And as of June 2006, at least 50 lawsuits have
been filed against the card associations, alleging violations of federal antitrust statutes and
involving thousands of merchants.
97 In part, these lawsuits reflect merchant frustration
with the costs of processing payments, but they also may reflect the introduction of
An Essay 17complex structures and rules that apply to interchange fees. The current merchant
lobbying efforts and lawsuits highlight the diversity of merchants—large and small—
who face entirely different environments with respect to interchange fees and other
arrangements for payment processing.
98 It is difficult to predict whether these efforts will
resolve the dispute.
99
Networks compete not just on price, principally interchange fees, but in other ways as
well. For example, they make routing agreements and bundle service offerings (such as
network switching and transaction processing). Continuing the “battleground” analogy,
these moves could be interpreted as “offensive,” that is, business practices aimed at
customer retention. 
But networks also have made some moves that could be interpreted as “defensive,” such
as keeping signature interchange fees relatively level and, in the case of MasterCard and
Visa, making organizational changes. After raising interchange fees every year since 1997,
Visa announced in March 2006 that it would hold its fees steady.
100 MasterCard kept
debit card interchange fees unchanged in 2006. Visa also has altered the way it sets inter-
change fees in a manner some feel would insulate it from allegations of price fixing. It
added eight independent members to its Board of Directors and created a committee
consisting of three or more independent directors who would determine interchange,
reimbursement, transactions, and service fees.
101MasterCard changed from an association
to a publicly traded company, possibly expecting that it would deflect charges of inap-
propriate price collusion.
102 Similar considerations may have been partially behind Visa’s
recent announcement to convert its U.S. operations to a publicly held company.
103
This discussion of the third competitive battleground implicitly assumes that PIN and
signature debit are distinct products. But some observers would argue that their func-
tions are so similar that it is reasonable to view them as part of a single debit payment
market.
104  Viewed this way, Visa has a large and growing market share. As can be seen
in Figure 9, Visa’s market share in the combined debit market hovered around 50
percent from 1995 to 2001, but increased to over 60 percent in 2005. Much of Visa’s
recent gain is in PIN debit. 
While much of the recent competitive activity has involved networks, there also have
been developments in competition among processors and among issuers.
105 One of
the most significant is that First Data and Visa have been involved in litigation over
transaction routing. First Data had been routing some Visa transactions from
merchant acquirers directly to card issuers and bypassing Visa’s network. In a settle-
ment, announced in July 2006, First Data agreed that it will not route “internally”
and Visa will provide First Data financial support to pursue mutual business oppor-
tunities and cost cutting.
106, 107
To complete this section, we note that the debit card industry faces a challenge from
another payment industry, the Automated Clearing House (ACH) system, which is
developing a number of payment options that could substitute for debit.
108The National
Automated Clearing House Association (NACHA), for example, is working to develop
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a new, safer online ACH payment product. A consumer who uses this payment option
at an online merchant/biller Web site would be redirected to their bank’s Web site for
payment authorization. Such a system has the advantage of keeping the account infor-
mation between the consumer and the bank.
109The consumer’s bank would authenticate
the consumer and guarantee payment to the merchant, for which it would be compen-
sated by a fee paid by the merchant.
110 A pilot is expected to begin in early 2007.
111
Several companies also are working on developing methods for initiating an ACH
payment at the POS. Debitman (Tempo, as of late 2006)—an ACH-based card
payment mechanism that enables participating retailers to become card issuers—may be
the best known of these companies, and it has entered into agreements lately that could
help it gain market acceptance. It has reached agreements with a number of retailers
including Wal-Mart, Burger King, Best Buy, Shell, Walgreens, and others, to accept the
card.
112 Payment processors that support Debitman include Fifth Third, RBS Lynk, and
Chase Paymentech. In May 2006, Debitman allied with HSBC Retail Services, an
issuer of private label credit cards, to issue cards on behalf of merchants and provide card
program support and fulfillment services.
113
There are other programs to create ACH debit cards as well. First Data is testing an
ACH debit card with the Stop and Shop grocery chain.
114 Binghamton Giant Markets
has had an ACH payment program since 1989 and will switch to Debitman to enable
customers to use the card at other merchants.
115 Biometric payment provider Pay-by-
Touch includes an ACH option in its system.
116 FastLane Secure Payments enables
consumers to use driver’s licenses to initiate POS payments that are settled on the ACH
system.
117 And a number of online retailers use e-check systems to allow consumers to
make an ACH payment.
118
Figure 9: Visa Combined Market Share of Signature and PIN Debit
Source: EFT Network Data Book (various years).
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A look ahead
Recap
This review has shown that the ATM side of the industry is retrenching while the debit
side of the industry is flourishing. There are many reasons for this divergence, but they
are related. Because it has become much easier to use payment alternatives, such as debit
and credit cards, today’s consumers do not need as much cash.
119 There is some irony in
the fact that at the same time that new opportunities for ATM revenue were on the rise
because of surcharging, the debit card industry was in the midst of a takeoff and card
industry promotion was heavy. In other words, just when banks were hoping that the
primary service offered by ATMs—dispensing cash—might generate significant revenue,
they were heavily pushing one of the most successful cash substitutes we have seen.
120
This last section considers an important issue that affects the outlook for both ATMs and
debit: data security and fraud. It then provides some comments on other key future
developments and concludes with some thoughts on policy considerations. 
Data security and fraud 
Data security and fraud are a cloud that hangs over the ATM and debit industry amid
heightened public, industry, and government awareness and concern. Data security and
fraud span both the ATM and debit industries because a compromise of a debit card’s
data can enable a criminal to exploit either the ATM or the debit function for fraudulent
purposes. We discuss data security and fraud in this section because continued compro-
mises of debit card data could undermine public confidence in both ATMs and debit
cards. 
First, the bad news. Probably the most disturbing recent data breach relevant to the ATM
and debit industry involves access to debit card numbers and associated PIN numbers.
In February 2006, criminals reportedly obtained debit card numbers and PINs through
a U.S. retailer, recreated debit cards, and made illicit ATM withdrawals in a number of
countries, including the United Kingdom, Canada, and Russia.
121 At least 200,000 debit
card numbers are thought compromised, and at least 20 financial institutions reissued
debit cards for their customers.
122 Perpetrators may have had access to decryption keys,
which would be a serious compromise of the system to protect PINs, but this has not
been confirmed by official sources.
123
Through most of this year it could be assumed this was an isolated incident, which
provided some comfort that the exploit may not be easily reproduced. But in August
2006 a second PIN breach was reported that had similar characteristics to the first except
it involved a different U.S. retailer.
124The report said that 150 consumers informed police
that $170,000 had been stolen from their accounts. Needless to say, it would be a serious
blow to PIN debit cards if the methods used in these breaches are difficult to counter and
they become widely known. 
 These PIN breaches come in the context of a rise in data breaches more generally. The
year 2005 has been identified as the worst year for breaches of data security.
125 And
fraud has been identified as the primary reason for a 2005 surge in chargebacks on
several networks.
126, 127
There has been concern that the U.S. ATM and debit industry will become more
inviting as a target when other countries beef up security by adopting chip cards.
Recent experience with computer chip debit cards in the United Kingdom suggests
that criminals will shift their efforts toward points of security weakness.
128The one area
where UK fraud increased was in card-not-present transactions, suggesting that the
chip-and-PIN technology made it harder to commit fraud in card-present transactions,
pushing it to card-not-present transactions. Given that chip-and-PIN cards are being
adopted in a number of other countries, this lends credibility to the notion that the
United States will become an increasingly attractive target for ATM and debit fraud. 
But there is good news. PIN debit traditionally has been regarded as safer than signa-
ture debit, and three recent studies show that PIN debit has less fraud than signature
debit.
129 In the first study, the fraud loss was 5.1 basis points for signature debit and 1.2
basis points for PIN debit.
130, 131 A second study’s estimates were 4.21 basis points for
signature debit and 0.29 basis points for PIN debit.
132 The third study again confirms
that PIN debit has less fraud than signature debit, although the difference is not as
pronounced at 2.6 basis points for signature debit and 2.2 basis points for PIN debit.
133
The United States may well be able to fight fraud by improving security systems for
magnetic stripe cards. For example, security features that NCR is introducing to its
ATMs can help foil exploits such as card skimming and clandestine observation of
ATM customers.
134 And many banks and merchants do not apply all of the security
features available to them for ATM and POS transaction, which if applied would
help deter fraud.
135 Moreover, the recent UK experience with chip-and-PIN cards
shows that the cards can significantly reduce card fraud.
136 While there are concerns
that a shift from magnetic stripe to chip cards would be expensive, at least there is a
solution available that could considerably strengthen debit card security.
137
The actual cost of data breaches may not be as high as might be feared. In a sample
of 500,000 breached identities, ID Analytics found just 1 in 1,000 were misused.
138
Javelin Research estimates that the number of adult victims of identity fraud in the
United States fell from 10.1 million to 8.9 million between 2003 and 2005.
139
Finally, the industry is responding to improve data security and antifraud systems.
Visa, MasterCard, and other payment card networks have developed data security
standards and are in the midst of the process of gaining compliance to those stan-
dards.
140 The process of securing the payments system requires some degree of
cooperation among industry participants and there are signs of collaboration. For
example, First Data and several large banks formed a joint venture to collaborate on
security measures.
141
An Essay 21While industry cooperative efforts are a positive step, it leaves out an important element
in securing any payment system: consumer behavior. Consumers ultimately determine
which payment method to use. Their decision is based on many factors, including risk
of fraud, consumer protections, price, and convenience. The incentive structure they face
could lead them to choose a less-secure payment method. For example, they may choose
a riskier payment instrument because it has a rewards program and/or has a zero-liability
consumer protection. In fact, some consumer advisers are discouraging the use of PIN
debit or any form of debit because they are riskier than credit cards.
142 While this may be
true from the consumer point of view, it is not necessarily true for society as a whole. 
The future
It seems likely there will be further shakeout in the ATM industry in light of the satu-
rated and possibly overbuilt market. The extent of the shakeout will depend upon
deployers finding a profitable mix of functionality, pricing, and location. But, unless
significant changes are made, some difficult adjustments are likely on the horizon, if
only because the ATM industry faces a strong head wind: a shift of retail payments
away from cash. 
Will ISOs or banks do better at making necessary adjustments? Banks place heavy
emphasis on the ATM as a delivery channel for financial services, and because few bank
customers use other functions, most banks view ATMs as cash dispensers.
143 But pinning
hopes on ATMs as substitutes for tellers in the face of a declining demand for cash seems
a tenuous cause for optimism. Some banks hope to change consumer perceptions of
ATMs by adding new functionality. One function attracting a lot of recent attention is
imaging capability, which would improve the ATMs attractiveness for taking deposits.
144
Because check usage also is declining, banks may consider alternative functions as well.
For example, the ATM could be used to initiate ACH transactions for person-to-person
or bill payments, as can be done at ATMs in other countries.
145They also could instantly
issue stored-value cards. If successful, ATMs may better live up to their promise of redi-
recting customers away from tellers as well as generating added revenue for banks. 
The current slowdown in transactions has stressed many ISOs, which often deploy
ATMs as cash dispensers. On the other hand, ISOs often can be innovative by
exploring nonfinancial services dispensed through ATMs. They appear more willing
to view an ATM like a vending machine, providing opportunities to sell many items,
with cash access being one of a number of features. According to one estimate, 67
percent of kiosk-style ATMs are installed in retailer locations and only three percent
at banks.
146 7-Eleven, in particular, has developed a multifunction ATM that report-
edly has had some success. The U.S. Postal Service and Cardtronics have shown
interest in these types of ATMs as well.
147
Debit’s current trajectory is likely to persist, which will make it an even more important
payment type in the future. Continued debit growth will come in part from substitution
of debit for cash. According to one estimate, 63 percent of retail transactions are made
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 with cash, so there is considerable room for growth for both PIN and signature debit.
148
The critical question, of course, is how will the industry evolve? Much will depend on
the answer to two additional questions. 
First, will the industry find a way to end the conflict between merchants and card
issuers/networks? Merchants are seeking change via three avenues: litigation, legislation,
and regulation. Past litigation has not ended the conflict. Settlement of the so-called Wal-
Mart suit in 2003 did not prevent a wave of new antitrust lawsuits filed in 2006 by
merchants against the card associations and issuers. Those suits are still outstanding. In
the legislative arena, hearings have been held on interchange fees, most recently by the
Senate Judiciary Committee.
149 To date, however, no legislation has come to pass. And
merchant groups also have called for regulatory action, citing steps taken by regulators in
other parts of the world, including Australia and the European Union. But, thus far,
regulatory initiatives have not been forthcoming.
Voluntary action may hold some promise. For example, as previously noted, Visa has
reorganized its interchange rate setting procedure in a fashion that, it claims, will grant
more merchant representation. MasterCard has become a public institution, and Visa
USA has announced plans to do so as well. Both Visa and MasterCard have disclosed or
have promised more disclosure of interchange fee rates and operating rules. And, recently,
there has been a “leveling off” of interchange fees. Only time will tell whether these will
be enough to diffuse the conflict. 
Second, what will happen in the PIN and signature debit rivalry? A number of factors,
including pricing, costs, profits, security, and product innovation, will greatly influence
the future. We envision four possible scenarios. 
In the first, both PIN and signature debit maintain differentiated products, and both
continue to grow with small shifts in their market shares. Merchants who are capable of
accepting PIN debit will continue to prefer PIN debit in order to take advantage of lower
cost and better security. Some consumers will prefer one type of debit to the other
because each maintains differences in security, consumer protection, rewards, and fees. 
In the second scenario, PIN and signature debit functions and features converge in a way
that makes them essentially indistinguishable to consumers. Visa and MasterCard, for
example, currently allow signature-less debit at many locations, and in the future,
contactless cards will encourage signature-less debit. Some PIN debit networks already
allow PIN-less debit online, and a change in network rules could allow these transactions
in other low-risk situations. A convergence between the two forms of debit in acceptance,
consumer protection, security, fees, and reward programs would tend to make consumers
indifferent between the two on these features. 
If PIN and signature debit were no longer differentiated from the consumer’s point of
view, then attraction to merchants and cost-effectiveness would help determine whether
one had a market advantage over the other. Security features could make both forms of
debit equal in the eyes of merchants. If so, then the price to the merchant for each type
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largely be determined by market leadership and scale of production. This would lead to
a market structure with a few large networks. 
A third scenario has PIN debit networks making use of price, convenience, and risk
advantages to slowly gain on signature debit. PIN debit has many market advantages to
exploit, such as lower risk and cost efficiency. Most large merchants already have installed
PIN pads, and expansion to smaller merchants may be helped by recent ISO offers of
free PIN pads to merchants, helping close the gap between signature and PIN debit
acceptance.
150 Innovation among PIN card issuers and networks can further increase the
attractiveness of the product.
151 There are efforts to make PIN debit more useful for
online purchases, such as those by Fiserv and its Accel/Exchange network. PIN networks
also are experimenting with adjustments to pricing to help enter new markets.
152
Under this scenario, a further narrowing of the difference between PIN and signature
interchange fees would help remove the bias of issuers toward signature debit, and they
would be more willing to put efforts toward product development in PIN debit. Some
consumer protections on PIN debit would need to be enhanced so that consumers are
indifferent on these features relative to signature debit.
In the fourth scenario, networks enhance their signature debit products and gain market
share. Signature debit networks keep their interchange fee high relative to PIN debit,
providing issuers more funds to support their reward and other promotion programs.
Better consumer protections make consumers choose signature over PIN debit. Issuers
further influence consumer incentives by embracing PIN fees and imposing transaction
caps on PIN debit that are lower than those for signature debit. Merchant attempts at
steering customers toward PIN debit fail because they cannot give consumers sufficient
incentive to overcome the pricing and consumer protection advantages of signature
debit. PIN debit networks lose transaction volume, forcing their unit costs to rise, which
limits their ability to innovate and develop their products. 
Though each has some plausibility, which of these scenarios is most likely to play out
is hard to predict because there are numerous conditions that must be met for each
outcome to occur. From society’s point of view, it would be best for the market to lead
to a payments system with the most desirable set of characteristics in terms of effi-
ciency, safety, and accessibility, and combinations of payment alternatives may best
serve this goal. 
Finally, a wild card for both PIN and signature debit is whether ACH alternatives for
retail payments become increasingly viable. These schemes face an uphill battle because
of issues such as control of risk and the classic chicken-and-egg problem of introducing
a network product to a market. But, as outlined above, there is a good deal of effort in
developing ACH products useful for POS and other retail transactions. Moreover, in
the absence of some solution to the current conflict between merchants and the credit
card networks, there will be considerable interest among merchants for cost-effective
payment alternatives. 
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Policy considerations
The U.S. retail payments system is in the midst of a fundamental transformation, from
paper-based transactions to electronic-based transactions. This shift—and the rising
predominance of debit card transactions in particular—raises a number of important
policy issues. These issues can be grouped under the general categories of safety, effi-
ciency, and accessibility.
The payment card industry is largely self-regulated. This raises the question, Is the
current supervisory framework adequate to ensure that the industry is safe and secure?
Are major participants in the industry subject to appropriate incentives? Merchants face
some incentives—they can incur penalties, either through pricing, chargebacks, or
licensing agreements. Financial institutions face some incentives as well. But are they
sufficient? And consumers face only limited incentives in light of zero-liability provisions
for signature and minimal-liability provisions for PIN debit. In addition, recently devel-
oped applications, such as contactless, signature-less, and PIN-less products, potentially
raise safety issues.
The debit card industry also has become more concentrated in recent years, especially if
the “market” is defined as combined signature plus PIN. Does this increased concentra-
tion warrant greater regulatory scrutiny? Is the debit card market sufficiently competitive
and efficient?
A number of issues arise in this context. Vertical integration—where a single firm
performs activities throughout the payments process—has seemingly advanced in recent
years. What are the incentives behind this strategy—to realize economies of scale and
scope, to create market power, or to reduce the market power of competitors? From a
competition policy standpoint, simply encouraging competition by limiting firm size or
reach may not be advisable in light of economies of scale, economies of scope, and the
two-sided nature of many payments markets. In what competitive environment—
monopoly, duopoly, oligopoly, or perfect competition—is the industry most efficient? 
Another efficiency issue intersects with safety issues. Cooperation among competitors is
becoming more prevalent as the industry attempts to combat data security and fraud
problems. While clearly beneficial, is there a line past which such cooperation has a nega-
tive impact on competition? More generally, increased security requirements likely make
payment card transactions more costly. What is the appropriate balance between security
(safety) and costs (efficiency)?
A third set of policy questions center around access issues. Many consumers, espe-
cially the unbanked and underbanked, recently have gained access to electronic
payments via EBT, payroll-card, and stored-value card products. Some of these prod-
ucts have only limited consumer-protection and fee- and rule-disclosure provisions,
however. Is access being gained, in some sense, at the cost of reduced security? On the
merchant side, smaller merchants in particular have seen their interchange fees rise in
recent years, making access to payment cards more expensive. And although alterna-
tives, such as ACH-based products, are beginning to appear, an overwhelming
amount of electronic transactions are still conducted via debit and credit cards. As
transactions become even more electronic, will small merchants’ costs of processing
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payments continue to rise? Might costs increase to the point where some merchants
simply cannot accept payment cards?
Answers to these questions are not easy. The ATM and debit card industry is inherently
complex. Moreover, the industry is currently going through a highly volatile, dynamic
period. Conditions are changing rapidly, seemingly daily. Policymakers and industry
participants alike need to stay informed and be prepared to make solid, sound decisions.
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27Chart 2: ATM Terminals

































Total annual transactions (left scale)
Annual transactions per ATM (right scale)









Note: Total annual transactions include bank on-us and in-network transactions. Data prior to 2002 include some gateway
transactions,and therefore they are likely overstated compared to 2002 and after.
Source: EFT Network Data Book (various years).
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Notes: For data prior to 2002,transaction volume for individual networks includes in-network,gateway,and bank on-us transactions.Market
share calculations are based on total ATM transactions that are defined to include all in-network transactions and bank on-us transactions.
Because a single transaction is possibly counted as an in-network transaction for one network and as a gateway transaction for other(s),
market shares for a group of networks may be inflated and sometimes above 100 percent.The level of market share for a group of networks
is probably less meaningful than the trend in market share.
For 2002 and after,transaction volume for individual networks includes in-network transactions.Market share calculations are based on the
sum of in-network transactions for the complete list of individual networks. Market shares are slightly inflated because data for a few
networks are unavailable and as a consequence the sum of in-network transactions are slightly understated.
Source: EFT Network Data Book (various years).
Chart 3: Number of Shared ATM Networks
Note: The authors count the number of networks each year based on various data sources.Included networks are the ones that authors can
identify the name of the networks,and therefore the numbers in this chart,especially in the 1980s,are possibly smaller than the actual numbers.
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Chart 6: Ownership Structure of Top 20 Regional ATM Networks
Source: EFT Network Data Book (various years).



































































Notes: For data prior to 2002, switch volume for individual networks includes in-network and gateway transactions for ATM and POS
transactions. Market share calculations are based on the sum of switch volume for the complete list of individual networks. The level of
market share for a group of networks is probably less meaningful than the trend in market share.
For 2002 and after, switch volume for individual networks includes in-network transactions for ATM and POS transactions. Market share
calculations are based on the sum of switch volume for the complete list of individual networks. Market share is slightly inflated because
data for a few networks is unavailable and as a consequence the sum of switch volume is slightly understated.
Source: EFT Network Data Book (various years).
 Chart 8: Ownership Concentration of ATM Terminals



















Chart 7: Concentration of EFT Transactions among the Top Five Processors
Note: Transaction volume for individual processors can double count a portion of total volume because the same transaction may be sent
over two or more processors.As a result, market shares for a group of processors may be inflated and sometimes above 100 percent.The
level of market share for a group of processors is probably less meaningful than the trend in market share.
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Sources: Debit Card Directory (various years); EFT Network Data Book (various years).
B: Interchange fees for withdrawals
A: Switch fees
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Chart 10: Debit Transactions























Chart 11: Online (PIN) Debit Share of Total Debit
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Chart 12: Cards with a Debit Function






















Debit cards in circulation (left scale)
Average annual transactions
per card (right scale)
Chart 13: Online (PIN) Debit Terminals


















Chart 14: Number of Online (PIN) Debit Networks 
















Chart 15: Concentration of Online (PIN) Debit Transaction Volume
Notes: For data prior to 2002, transaction volume for individual networks includes in-network and gateway transactions. Market share
calculations are based on total online (PIN) debit transactions as shown in Chart 10. Because a single transaction is possibly counted as an 
in-network transaction for one network and as a gateway transaction for other(s), market shares for a group of networks may be inflated and
sometimes above 100 percent.The level of market share for a group of networks is probably less meaningful than the trend in market share.
For 2002 and after,transaction volume for individual networks includes in-network transactions.Market share calculations are based on the
sum of in-network transactions for the complete list of individual networks.
Data are shown for 1990 and after.While data for calculations of market share are available for earlier years,we believe the results are not reliable.
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Chart 17:  Concentration of Debit Cards in Circulation among the Top Debit Card Issuers



















Note: “Top 10”issuers in terms of number of transactions by its cardholders.
Source: EFT Network Data Book (various years).Statistical Update 37
Chart 18: Online (PIN) Debit Card Coverage among the Top EFT Networks



























Chart 19: Trends in Switch Fees for Online (PIN) Debit Transactions
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Chart 20: Acquirer and Card Issuer Responsibility for Online (PIN) Debit Switch Fees 
1995,2002 and 2006
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Sources: Debit Card Directory (various years); EFT Network Data Book (various years).
 ATM Networks 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002
Star 3,781,051 61,586,816  146,647,389  507,192,813  630,000,000  785,000,000 
NYCE 6,700,000 63,759,707  115,097,672  255,650,000  302,553,000  317,680,650 
Pulse 11,053,249 32,145,344 59,355,448  156,912,399  187,003,492  277,477,478 
Plus - Visa n.a. 8,400,000  15,000,000  37,525,000  51,195,000  58,697,000 
Jeanie n.a. 1,645,000 6,966,218  23,198,225  21,221,542  20,822,293 
MoneyMaker 1,567,000 4,415,000 8,276,077  14,803,376  28,014,400  29,743,000 
Co-op Network n.a.  1,645,000  6,966,218  23,198,225  21,221,542  20,822,293 
Presto 1,870,481 4,388,276 6,500,000 7,600,000  8,000,000  9,812,000 
Shazam 4,225,000 7,379,056  11,132,907 9,508,084  9,723,167  9,437,242 
ACCEL/Exchange  4,700,000 18,200,000 25,000,000 47,000,000  7,000,000  8,585,500 
Notes: Networks are ranked by monthly transaction volume in 2002.Transaction volume for individual networks includes in-network,bank on-us,
and gateway transaction.Data for Cirrus (MasterCard) are unavailable for years listed in this table.It was in the top 10 in 1990 and 1998,the
most recent years for which Cirrus data were reported.It would likely rank in the top 10 in 2002.
n.a.= not available or no data
Source: EFT Network Data Book (various years).
ATM Networks 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Star 78,148,000 88,080,500 79,543,800  68,729,000  66,226,600 
Plus - Visa 48,619,507  34,018,000  38,264,000  43,000,000  58,000,000 
NYCE 30,025,000 35,871,000 36,005,500  38,508,600  36,890,000 
Co-op Network 29,107,486  29,085,740  31,315,569  32,806,446  33,915,374 
Pulse 22,057,866 23,427,150 26,096,729  26,596,000  27,100,000 
Jeanie 13,158,000 14,405,000 21,276,275  20,638,000  20,844,380 
AFFN 5,200,000 10,000,000 11,000,000  6,000,000  6,400,000 
ACCEL/Exchange 3,103,000  1,978,000  3,561,000  4,435,000  4,596,000 
Networks 3,700,000 4,000,000 4,120,000  4,326,000  4,300,000 
Shazam 8,125,082 9,036,594 9,462,904  3,576,379  3,554,295 
Notes: Networks are ranked by monthly in-network transaction volume in 2006.
Data for Cirrus (MasterCard) are unavailable for years listed in this table. It would likely rank in the top 10 in 2006.
Source: EFT Network Data Book (various years).
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ATM Networks 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Star 28.5% 31.0% 27.6% 25.4% 23.7%
Plus - Visa 17.7% 12.0% 13.3% 15.9% 20.8%
NYCE 10.9% 12.6% 12.5% 14.3% 13.2%
Co-op Network 10.6% 10.2% 10.9% 12.1% 12.1%
Pulse 8.0% 8.2% 9.1% 9.8% 9.7%
Jeanie 4.8% 5.1% 7.4% 7.6% 7.5%
AFFN 1.9% 3.5% 3.8% 2.2% 2.3%
ACCEL/Exchange 1.1% 0.7% 1.2% 1.6% 1.6%
Networks 1.3% 1.4% 1.4% 1.6% 1.5%
Shazam 3.0% 3.2% 3.3% 1.3% 1.3%




Notes: Networks are ranked by market share in 2006.Transaction volume for individual networks includes in-network transactions.Market share
calculations are based on the sum of in-network transactions for the complete list of individual networks. Market shares are slightly inflated
because a data for a few networks are unavailable and as a consequence the sum of in-network transactions is slightly understated.
Data for Cirrus (MasterCard) are unavailable for years listed in this table.It would likely rank in the top 10 in 2006.
Source: EFT Network Data Book (various years).
A: 2002 ranking
ATM Networks 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002
Star 1.3% 12.9% 18.2% 47.4% 55.7% 88.9%
NYCE 2.3% 13.3% 14.3% 23.9% 26.7% 36.0%
Pulse 3.7% 6.7% 7.4% 14.7% 16.5% 31.4%
Plus - Visa n.a. 1.8% 1.9% 3.5% 4.5% 6.6%
Jeanie n.a. 0.3% 0.9% 2.2% 1.9% 2.4%
MoneyMaker 0.5% 0.9% 1.0% 1.4% 2.5% 3.4%
Co-op Network n.a. 0.3% 0.9% 2.2% 1.9% 2.4%
Presto 0.6% 0.9% 0.8% 0.7% 0.7% 1.1%
Shazam 1.4% 1.5% 1.4% 0.9% 0.9% 1.1%
ACCEL/Exchange 1.6% 3.8% 3.1% 4.4% 0.6% 1.0%
Notes: Networks are ranked by market share in 2002. Transaction volume for individual networks includes in-network, bank on-us, and
gateway transactions.Market share calculations are based on total ATM transactions that are defined to include all in-network transactions
and bank on-us transactions. Gateway transactions can double count a portion of ATM volume because the same transaction may be
sent over two or more networks and as a consequence market share may be overstated in some cases.
Data for Cirrus (MasterCard) are unavailable for years listed in this table. It was in the top 10 in 1990 and 1998, the most recent years for
which Cirrus data were reported.It would likely rank in the top 10 in 2002.
n.a.= not available or no data
Source: EFT Network Data Book (various years).
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Table 3: Top National and Regional Networks by Number of ATM Terminals
A: Number of ATMs in network
National ATM Networks 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Plus  -  Visa 5,617  25,000  99,801  242,000  298,981 309,695  365,506 354,334  389,000  394,500 
Cirrus - MasterCard 8,119  31,726  104,000  189,000  210,000  325,000  355,000  371,000  383,000  384,000 
Regional EFT Networks 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Star 1,064  10,851  20,751  115,000  180,000 224,000  244,000 264,000  276,000  291,000 
NYCE 1,110 9,504  16,638 35,000  44,000  77,000  104,600  151,800  191,000  275,000 
Pulse 3,451 5,110  9,500 46,299  76,563  92,000  200,412  251,884  250,000  250,000 
ACCEL/Exchange 1,030  2,960  3,796  8,430  25,000 27,500  32,000 53,000  73,000 100,000 
Credit Union 24 n.a.  126  2,751  6,500  7,200  7,250  13,500  15,100  50,000  93,849 
Co-op  Network n.a.  155  1,003  3,720  4,615 11,472  15,425 17,772  19,690  25,321 
MoneyMaker 835  1,015  3,902  15,796  20,080 23,955  27,878 31,500  23,507  24,000 
Shazam 678 1,142  2,169  4,680  5,528 5,926  7,079 8,499  9,408 10,457 
Fastbank 326 481  1,156  542 534 551  3,350  7,500 9,379  9,500 
Instant  Cash 367  812  1,797  3,300  3,920 8,300  8,052 7,843  8,135  8,200 
Total ATMs 60,000  80,156  122,706  273,000  324,000  352,000  371,000  383,000  396,000  395,000 
B: Direct coverage of the U.S.ATM network
National ATM Networks 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Plus - Visa 9.4% 31.2% 81.3% 88.6% 92.3% 88.0% 98.5% 92.5% 98.2% 99.9%
Cirrus - MasterCard 13.5% 39.6% 84.8% 69.2% 64.8% 92.3% 95.7% 96.9% 96.7% 97.2%
Regional EFT Networks 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Star 1.8% 13.5% 16.9% 42.1% 55.6% 63.6% 65.8% 68.9% 69.7% 73.7%
NYCE 1.9% 11.9% 13.6% 12.8% 13.6% 21.9% 28.2% 39.6% 48.2% 69.6%
Pulse 5.8% 6.4% 7.7% 17.0% 23.6% 26.1% 54.0% 65.8% 63.1% 63.3%
ACCEL/Exchange 1.7% 3.7% 3.1% 3.1% 7.7% 7.8% 8.6% 13.8% 18.4% 25.3%
Credit Union 24 n.a. 0.2% 2.2% 2.4% 2.2% 2.1% 3.6% 3.9% 12.6% 23.8%
Co-op Network n.a. 0.2% 0.8% 1.4% 1.4% 3.3% 4.2% 4.6% 5.0% 6.4%
MoneyMaker 1.4% 1.3% 3.2% 5.8% 6.2% 6.8% 7.5% 8.2% 5.9% 6.1%
Shazam 1.1% 1.4% 1.8% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.9% 2.2% 2.4% 2.6%
Fastbank 0.5% 0.6% 0.9% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.9% 2.0% 2.4% 2.4%
Instant Cash 0.6% 1.0% 1.5% 1.2% 1.2% 2.4% 2.2% 2.0% 2.1% 2.1%
Notes: Networks are ranked by the number of terminals in their network in 2006. Direct coverage is the number of terminals in the national
or regional network divided by total ATM terminals.
n.a.= not available or no data
Source: EFT Network Data Book (various years).Statistical Update 43
Table 4: Types of ATM Fees of Depository Institutions
Category Frequency Fee Set by Description
Retail Periodic Annual Cardholder bank Paid by cardholders to his/her bank for ATM services. 
Card Cardholder bank Paid by cardholder to his/her bank upon issuance of an ATM card.
Per transaction Foreign Cardholder bank Paid by cardholder to his/her bank for a transaction on an ATM 
not owned by the bank.
Surcharge ATM owner Paid by cardholder to ATM owner. Typcally not charged if ATM is owned 
by cardholder's bank.
On-us Cardholder bank Paid by cardholder to his/her bank for an ATM withdrawal on 
an ATM owned by the bank.
Wholesale Periodic Membership Network Paid by financial institution to network upon initial membership. 
Monthly/ Network Paid by financial institution to network on periodic basis, often 
Annually tied to sales volume of card program.
Per transaction Switch Network Paid by cardholder's bank to network for routing transaction information.
Interchange Network Paid by cardholder's bank to ATM owner for deploying and 
maintaining ATM.
Table 5: Retail ATM Fees of Depository Institutions
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Percent offering 
ATM services 79.6 72.9 79.4 86.5 87.3 88.8 90.9 93.4
Percent charging
Annual fee 18.9 13.4 16.7 15.1 17.4 13.1 10.7 10.3
Card fee 8.2 10 6.2 5.4 8 5.9 3.5 4
On-us fee 9.6 6.8 7.4 6.4 6.4 6.2 3.6 2.7
Foreign fee 85.3 79.8 67 74.5 72.3 72.7 78.5 69
Surcharge n.a. 44.8 60.1 77.9 82.9 75.4 88.5 89.4
Average charge
Annual  fee $13.07  $7.94 $11.51 $13.12  $7.90 $10.79 $10.35 $11.65 
Card  fee $5.29 $4.89 $3.88 $4.56 $4.58 $6.23 $4.51 $6.39 
On-us  fee $0.61 $0.59 $0.65 $0.68 $0.54 $0.71 $0.81 $0.56 
Foreign  fee $1.03 $1.10 $1.06 $1.10 $1.17 $1.16 $1.17 $1.14 
Surcharge n.a. $1.19 $1.14 $1.20 $1.26 $1.26 $1.32 $1.36 
Notes: The sample design for 2000,2001 and 2002 was somewhat different than that for earlier years.
n.a.= not available or no data
Definitions: Annual fees are charged to deposit customers who choose to use ATM services.
Card fees are charged upon issuance of a card.
On-us fees are for withdrawals from ATMs owned by the cardholder's financial institution.
Foreign fees are for transactions that are on ATM terminals that are not owned by the cardholder's financial institution.
Surcharges are levied on ATM users by the owner of the machine.Typically there is no surcharge if the ATM is owned 
by the cardholder's financial institution.
Source: Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System (1996 to 2003 reports).44 A Guide to the ATM and Debit Card Industry: 2006 Update
Table 6: Top 10 EFT Networks by Number of Online (PIN) Debit Transactions
EFT Networks 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Star 9,919,576 40,253,249  88,092,838  101,566,095  177,270,000  235,164,000 
Interlink (Visa) 16,500,000  15,300,000  18,488,623  28,599,510  32,388,807  59,038,154 
NYCE 3,555,548 11,100,000  15,600,000  22,800,000  35,400,000  43,624,000 
Pulse 3,079,624 10,403,370  15,422,917  18,123,757  23,267,096  41,833,522 
Co-op Network 1,632,072  5,300,000  6,175,200  9,206,649  11,417,384  15,101,581 
Jeanie 732,000 1,117,000  2,356,801  6,400,000  8,378,000  12,155,000 
ACCEL/Exchange 2,386,089  10,117,072  10,782,206  11,000,000  11,000,000  11,500,000 
Presto 2,000,000 2,500,000  1,488,709  3,100,000  3,600,000  4,415,400 
Credit Union 24 n.a.  450,000  470,000  2,000,000  2,504,000  3,900,000 
Shazam 837,961 1,267,660  1,488,709  2,395,942  3,268,011  3,516,986 
Note: Networks are ranked by monthly transaction volume in 2002.Transaction volume for individual networks includes in-network and
gateway transactsion.
n.a.= not available or no data
Source: EFT Network Data Book (various years).
EFT Networks 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Interlink (Visa) 59,038,154  69,619,116  113,513,650  238,620,435  330,833,280 
Star 235,164,000 210,461,600  243,954,000  224,982,300 244,014,300 
Pulse 41,364,813 44,207,200  64,787,110  85,583,000 95,900,000 
NYCE 39,061,000 49,423,000  57,378,300  64,465,200 81,226,152 
ACCEL/Exchange 12,900,000  16,045,000  17,254,000  25,844,000  34,752,000 
Credit Union 24 3,900,000  5,278,945  8,599,466  11,586,597  13,861,112 
Shazam 3,160,065 4,536,394  6,264,746  9,106,093  11,555,221 
AFFN 8,500,000 9,000,000  13,000,000  9,000,000 9,600,000 
Presto 4,000,000 5,298,000  5,000,000  6,170,000 7,774,200 
Jeanie 1,164,000 992,000 4,723,844  5,829,000  7,344,540 
Note: Networks are ranked by monthly in-network transaction volume in 2006.
Source: EFT Network Data Book (various years).
A: 2002 rank
B: 2006 rank
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EFT Networks 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Star 15.4% 26.8% 43.5% 39.2% 58.3% 55.8%
Interlink (Visa) 25.5% 10.2% 9.1% 11.0% 10.7% 14.0%
NYCE 5.5% 7.4% 7.7% 8.8% 11.6% 10.3%
Pulse 4.8% 6.9% 7.6% 7.0% 7.7% 9.9%
Co-op Network 2.5% 3.5% 3.1% 3.6% 3.8% 3.6%
Jeanie 1.1% 0.7% 1.2% 2.5% 2.8% 2.9%
ACCEL/Exchange 3.7% 6.7% 5.3% 4.2% 3.6% 2.7%
Presto 3.1% 1.7% 0.7% 1.2% 1.2% 1.0%
Credit Union 24 n.a.  0.3% 0.2% 0.8% 0.8% 0.9%
Shazam 1.3% 0.8% 0.7% 0.9% 1.1% 0.8%
Table 7: Top 10 EFT Networks by Share of Online (PIN) Debit Transactions
A: 2002 rank
B: 2006 rank
EFT Networks 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Interlink (Visa) 14.4% 16.6% 21.1% 34.8% 39.4%
Star 57.3% 50.3% 45.4% 32.8% 29.1%
Pulse 10.1% 10.6% 12.0% 12.5% 11.4%
NYCE 9.5% 11.8% 10.7% 9.4% 9.7%
ACCEL/Exchange 3.1% 3.8% 3.2% 3.8% 4.1%
Credit Union 24 1.0% 1.3% 1.6% 1.7% 1.7%
Shazam 0.8% 1.1% 1.2% 1.3% 1.4%
AFFN 2.1% 2.2% 2.4% 1.3% 1.1%
Presto 1.0% 1.3% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9%
Jeanie 0.3% 0.2% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9%
Note: Networks are ranked by market share in 2002.Transaction volume for individual networks includes in-network and gateway trans-
actsion. Market share calculations are bassed on total online (PIN) debit transactions. Gateway transactions can double count a por-
tion of total volume because the same transaction may be sent over two or more networks and as a consequence market share may
be overstated in some cases.
n.a.= not available or no data
Source: EFT Network Data Book (various years).
Note: Networks are ranked by market share in 2006. Transaction volume for individual networks includes in-network transactions. Market
share calculations are based on the sum of in-network transactions for the complete list of individual networks.
Source: EFT Network Data Book (various years).
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EFT Networks 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Star 20,330 32,480  80,000  124,000  127,010  127,400  138,800  134,000  141,000 
Interlink (Visa) 12,000  30,000  50,000  60,000  63,000  70,000  87,000  91,000  123,100 
AFFN n.a. n.a.  60,000  78,000  82,000  84,000  86,000  89,000  92,000 
Pulse 8,500 13,000  40,000  60,000  80,000  90,000  90,000  90,000  90,000 
NYCE 16,513 28,500  45,100  48,000  52,100  55,000  57,400  59,100  74,600 
Maestro (MC) n.a.  13,300  34,900  38,000  40,000  38,000  40,000  40,000  40,000 
Co-op Network 631  2,900  7,400  8,600  11,200  19,623  22,275  23,474  24,098 
Instant Cash 1,336  3,500  4,600  5,030  17,000  16,116  15,260  18,061  18,800 
ACCEL/Exchange 4,800  7,379  12,600  8,000  8,000  6,271  11,456  15,070  17,200 
Credit Union 24 1,300  1,800  6,000  7,000  7,100  10,000  10,000  12,000  14,200 
Table 8: Top 10 Online Debit Networks by Number of Cards
A: Number of cards in network (thousands)
B: Coverage of the U.S.online (PIN) debit network
EFT Networks 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Star 10.6% 15.3% 31.3% 46.3% 45.2% 42.6% 43.6% 40.7% 38.0%
Interlink (Visa) 6.3% 14.2% 19.5% 22.4% 22.4% 23.4% 27.4% 27.7% 33.1%
AFFN n.a. n.a.  23.4% 29.1% 29.2% 28.1% 27.0% 27.0% 24.8%
Pulse 4.4% 6.1% 15.6% 22.4% 28.5% 30.1% 28.3% 27.3% 24.2%
NYCE 8.6% 13.5% 17.6% 17.9% 18.5% 18.4% 18.1% 18.0% 20.1%
Maestro (MC) n.a. 6.3% 13.6% 14.2% 14.2% 12.7% 12.6% 12.2% 10.8%
Co-op Network 0.3% 1.4% 2.9% 3.2% 4.0% 6.6% 7.0% 7.1% 6.5%
Instant Cash 0.7% 1.7% 1.8% 1.9% 6.0% 5.4% 4.8% 5.5% 5.1%
ACCEL/Exchange 2.5% 3.5% 4.9% 3.0% 2.8% 2.1% 3.6% 4.6% 4.6%
Credit Union 24 0.7% 0.9% 2.3% 2.6% 2.5% 3.3% 3.1% 3.6% 3.8%
Note: Networks are ranked by the number of online (PIN) debit cards in 2006.Coverage is the number of cards in the network divided by total
online (PIN) debit cards.
n.a.= not available or no data 
Source: EFT Network Data Book (various years).Statistical Update 47
Table 9: Types of Debit Card Fees
Category Frequency Fee Set by Description
Retail Periodic Card Cardholder bank Paid by cardholder to his/her bank upon issuance of a debit card.
Per transaction PIN Cardholder bank Paid by cardholder to his/her bank for an online debit transaction.
Rewards Cardholder bank Paid by bank to cardholder for an offline debit transaction. 
Wholesale Periodic Membership Network Paid by financial institution to network upon initial membership. 
Monthly/ Network Paid by financial institution to network on periodic basis, often tied 
Annually to sales volume of card program. 
Per transaction Discount Merchant acquirer Paid by mercant to acquirer. 
Switch Network Paid by cardholder's bank and acquirer to network for routing 
transaction information.
Interchange Network Paid by acquirer to cardholder's bank.06 05 04 03 02 01 00 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 92 91 90 89 88 87 86 85 84 83 82 81 80 79 78 77 76 75 74 73 72
Year
06 05 04 03 02 01 00 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 92 91 90 89 88 87 86 85 84 83 82 81 80 79 78 77 76 75 74 73 72
Note: See Chart A2 for details of existing networks as of September 2006.
Sources: Co-op Network; CUNA; Card Industry Directory; Debit Card Directory; EFT Network Data Book; Star Systems; and others (various years).
Chart A1: Timeline of Regional EFT Networks
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Note: See continuation of Chart A2 on next page.
Chart A2: Timeline of Selected Regional EFT Networks
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Chart A2 (cont.): Timeline of Selected Regional EFT Networks
Network 06 05 04 03 02 01 00 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 92 91 90 89 88 87 86 85 84 83 82 81 80 79 78 77 76 75 74 73 72
















































Universal Money1 Reproduced from Chart 1, p.28.
2 See Chart 2, p. 28. 
3 See Chart 3, p. 29.
4 See Chart 4, p. 29.
5  Until 2002, networks reported in-network, bank on-us, and gateway transactions all in a single number. The reporting
method changed in 2002. Since then, networks have reported in-network and gateway transactions as separate data. Bank
on-us transactions have not been reported. A network’s in-network transaction is defined as the transaction which is
switched directly to the card issuer (or its processor) by the network. A network’s gateway transaction is defined as the
transaction which is switched to another network by the network. A single transaction is, therefore, possibly counted as
an in-network transaction for one network and as a gateway transaction for the other. Market shares for a group of net-
works, prior to 2002, are the group of networks’ in-network, bank on-us, and gateway transaction volume divided by the
total transaction volume. Market shares for a group of networks, 2002 and after, are the group of networks’ in-network
transaction volume divided by the sum of all networks’ in-network transaction volume. Excluding bank on-us transactions
for 2002 and after is appropriate because no network performs switching for those transactions. Excluding gateway trans-
actions complicates interpretation of market share and may mask some trends. However, including gateway transactions
creates another problem: Some networks likely have reported their gateway transactions including transactions they
acquired as acquirer processors not as networks. 
6  See Table 1, p. 40.
7  See Table 2, p. 41.
8 One of the biggest changes that occurred when the method for reporting network transactions changed in 2002 was a
large increase in the market share for Plus. This is seen in Table 1, p. 40, and Table 2, p. 41, where data for both methods
are reported. Reported volumes for each network declined under the new method because bank on-us and gateway trans-
actions were excluded, leaving in-network transactions. Plus’s market share increased from 6.6 percent under the previous
method to 17.7 percent under the new method, and its rank rose from fourth to second. There is some suspicion that
Plus’s transaction volume includes both in-network and gateway volume. 
9  See Table 3, p. 42.
10 On August 28, 2006 Pulse’s Web site reported 4,200 members, while in March 2001 Pulse reported 2,888 members
(Credit Card Management, 2001, p. 391). See also “2 Networks Show ATM Volume Gain,” ATM & Debit News, January
16, 2003; pp. 1, 3; “WRG Services Joins NYCE Network,” ATMmarketplace.com, October 19, 2000, available at
www.atmmarketplace.com/research.htm?article_id=4919&pavilion=50&step=story; and “XtraCash Joins NYCE Network,”
ATMmarketplace.com, May 1, 2002, available at www.atmmarketplace.com/research.htm?article_id=12356&pavil-
ion=50&step=story.
11  See Chart 6, p. 30.
12  The bank joint venture appeared to make a slight comeback in 2004, but in fact the new additions of this form of own-
ership to the top 20 was due to consolidation of three top-20 networks, which in turn allowed some smaller, joint venture
networks to appear on the top-20 list. Changes in the number of ATM networks owned by nonbanks since 2002 have
been a result of mergers and acquisitions. Four events caused changes in the nonbank group since 2002. First, in 2002
EDS sold three separate networks to Fiserv, who in turn consolidated them into one network in 2004. Second, in 2003,
First Data acquired Concord EFS, which gave First Data control of Star. First Data, which owned a majority interest in
NYCE, subsequently sold NYCE to Metavante. In these transactions, Star remained under the control of a nonbank but
control of NYCE changed from nonbank to bank. Third, the status of MoneyMaker changed from nonbank to single-
bank ownership when Elan, a subsidiary of U.S. Bank, bought it from Genpass in 2004. Fourth, also in 2004, Pulse was
acquired by Discover Financial Services, changing its status from a bank joint venture to nonbank ownership. 
13 “Integrated Platforms Moving Up Banks’ Agendas,” ePaynews, August 18, 2004, available at www.epaynews.com/index.cgi?sur-
vey=&keywords=metavante&optional=&subject=&location=&ref=keyword&f=view&id=1092838562622215212&block=.
14  Breitkopf, 2004. 
15  “NCR Makes Low-Cost ATM Bid in Tidel Buy,” ATM & Debit News, January 5, 2005, p. 1; “Consolidation Continues
among ATM Drivers,” ATM & Debit News, July 14, 2005, pp.1-2. 
16  “Efmark, Bantek Merger Adds a Third Major Player to ATM Servicing Market,” ATM & Debit News, January 19, 2006,
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